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The purpose of this paper is to study how political connections affect the employees’ 
benefits and the firm performance of private firms listed in Chinese stock market. I use a 
sample of 1,583 private firms from15 industries in Chinese A-share market (Shenzhen 
and Shanghai stock market) from 2008 to 2017. I find that the employees’ benefits in 
politically connected firms are not as high as generally expected, but the firms with 
political connections hire more employees in order to show their social responsibility. 
Common perception is that a politically connected firm will get lots of benefits from the 
government; however, the results show that the political connections damage the 
performance of the firm. The results also show that the improvement of employees’ 
benefits improves the firm performance, and the representative connection plays a more 
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1. Introductions and Background 
 
With the development and transformation of the Chinese economy, private firms have 
become an important part in Chinese market. In the past thirty years, private firms have 
played a significant role in promoting employment, paying taxes and accelerating 
economic development. However, compared with the inherent advantages of state-owned 
firms, the development of private firms is still constrained by the local government and 
the legal system. The institutional environment shapes the private entrepreneur's 
motivation to participate in politics (Li (2007)). Private firms try to establish political 
connections. Political connections of companies is a widespread phenomenon throughout 
the world. Many firms in developed countries and developing countries have established 
close ties with the government. But is it good for the firms to get political connections? 
The answer to this question is critical for companies and the society. 
 
China has the largest populations in the world today based on the data from United 
Nations estimates. 1  Even though the population growth is slow, there are still almost 
900 million people of working age in China (Report of Employment Promotion Law of 
the People's Republic of China (2019)). 2  The provision of employment is still the most 
important task of the government. According to prime minister Li Keqiang, whereas the 
market is more interested in GDP growth rate, Chinese government’s top priority is 
employment.3  The number of new graduates is more than 8 million and the provision of 
employment to them is a big concern of the government.4 Chinese chairman Xi Jinping 
(2018) points that Private firms in China take 80% employments. 5  Do the Chinese 
private firms take more (less) responsibility for the employment after they establish 
 
1 https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/china-population/ Retrieved on December 21, 2019 
2http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/201908/f5b70bfd15fd4548a241d35ff25c7c42.shtml 
Retrieved on December 21, 2019. 
3 http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-07/26/c_137350120.htm   Retrieved on December 19, 2019. 
 
4 https://www.economist.com/china/2019/08/01/the-growing-ranks-of-unemployed-graduates-worry-
chinas-government Retrieved on December 19, 2019.  
5https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2171267/xi-jinping-tells-chinas-private-business-
owners-you-can Retrieved on December 21, 2019 
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political connections? Several recent research studies investigate the link between the 
political connections and the private firms focus on taxes (Adhikari et al. (2006), Wu et al. 
(2012), Li. (2016), Kim and Zhang. (2016)), loans (Yeh (2013), Houston and Ma (2014), 
Li (2016)) and firm performance (Zhang (2015), Lim (2018)). However, the research 
studies focusing on the relationship between the number of employees, the employees’ 
benefits and the political connections are rare. This study focuses on the relation between 
political connections, employees’ number and employment benefits. 
 
In China, both the employer and the employees should contribute towards mandatory 
benefits, and these benefits consist of medical insurance, endowment insurance, 
unemployment insurance, maternity insurance, work-related injury insurance and housing 
accumulation funds. Do the politically connected private firms pay more (less) employees’ 
benefits than others not politically connected ones? The big difference between private 
firms and the state-owned firms is that private firms put business goal to maximize their 
profits first, but the SOE put the government’s goals first. So, in their operation, will the 
private companies follow the lead of the political connections and implement government 
initiated welfare protection policies? Do the employees’ interests and firm interests 
converge or diverge? Do the political connections have a positive or a negative effect on 
the firm’s performance? This paper investigates these questions. 
 
This study selects the listed private firms in Chinese A-share market (Shenzhen and 
Shanghai stock market) from 2008 to 2017 as the sample. The financial statements, 
executives, shareholders and other related information of listed private firms come from 
Csmar database. The political connections data is manually collected from the firm's 
annual reports in Csmar database. The final sample used for the study includes 1,583 
private listed firms in 15 industries with 10,331 firm year observations.    
 
There are four main findings of this paper. Firstly, the employees’ benefits in politically 
connected firms are not as high as we generally expect. The employees’ benefits at the 
representative connection firms are lower. Secondly, politically connected firms employ 
more employees than other firms. Thirdly, key executives who have political connections 
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damage the performance of the firm. The politically connected firm is subjected to 
intervention from the government to achieve the goal of expanding employment and 
promoting social stability. Labor cost is a huge cost for private firms, and this cost may 
exceed the benefits they get from the political connections.  Finally, I find that the 
improvement of employees’ benefits promotes the firm performance, and the 
representative connection plays a more important role in improving the performance of a 
firm.  
The paper is organized as follow: Section 2 reviews the literature and provides 
hypotheses. Section 3 shows the data resources used in the paper. Section 4 analyses the 
results and section 5 is the conclusion. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
2.1 Political connections  
 
Political connections of private firms are a general phenomenon in the world. Faccio 
(2006) shows that the political connections exist in 35 of 47 countries in her sample. 
There are many different definitions of political connections used in the existing studies. 
Bertrand et al. (2008) and Do et al. (2015) defined political connections broadly by 
following a social network approach: a firm is connected to a politician if one of its 
directors shares educational background with a politician. However, a majority of the 
researchers consider political connections as direct relationship between firm and 
politicians. A company is defined as politically connected if at least one of its top officers 
(CEO, chairman, president, vice president, or secretary of the board) or a large 
shareholder was head of state, government, or a member of the national parliament 
(Faccio (2006), Ang (2013), Braham et al (2019)). Many researchers focus on the 
political connections in China because of the specific political system.  Pan et al. (2008) 
consider that a firm is politically connected if one of the general managers or chairmen 
are serving (have served) as government officers. Wu et al. (2008) define the political 
connections as “the implicit political relationship formed between a company and an 
individual with political rights” (Page 2). The definition of this implicit relationship is 
mainly based on the company's chairman or general manager who has served in the 
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government or the military. Chinese research studies generally consider that the firms are 
politically connected when they meet one of the three conditions: i) former government 
officials serve as corporate executive; ii) former government officials  start businesses; iii) 
corporate executives or actual controllers participate in politics as elected representatives 
of the People's Congress or as Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC ) members (Liang et al (2010)).  
 
2.2 Political connections, Employments and firm performance 
 
China is a country with a large population. The total population of working age is also 
very large6. Although the population at working-age 16-59 has fallen by an average 3.82 
million per year since 2012, there are still nearly 900 million people in China at the age 
of working, and it estimated that there will still be 800 million people at working-age by 
2035 (Report of Employment Promotion Law of the People's Republic of China (2019)). 7 
Moreover, State Council documents (2018) point out that all levels of government and 
firms should set out the employment as a priority and pay more attention to promoting 
employment. Therefore, the provision of employment is still a big challenge for China 
and the Chinese firms. Chinese President Xi Jinping (2018) has stated that private firms 
are the most important part of the Chinese economy. They contribute more than 60% 
GDP and are responsible for 80% of the employment. Nearly 90% of new employment is 
in private firms and more than 50% of taxes come from private firms. However, the 
development of private firms is still constrained by the local government and the legal 
system. In order to protect the external environment so that a company may survive and 
develop, private firms often actively seek political connections and expect to obtain 
benefits (Wang et al (2005)).  This paper studies the relation between political 
connections and the Chinese private firms. In China, the government holds the right to 
allocate important resources (Zhang. (2013)). Due to political system and cultural reasons, 
private firms have obtained a favorable environment for survival and development by 
 
6 The number of graduates has also been rising.  
7 http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/201908/f5b70bfd15fd4548a241d35ff25c7c42.shtml 
Retrieved on December 21, 2019. 
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affiliating with SOEs, hiring government officials as manager, and establishing party 
organizations in firms (Liang et al. (2010)). With the development of the private 
economy, more and more private entrepreneurs have become members of the National 
People's Congress or members of the CPPCC and thus they are directly participating in 
politics (Liang et al. (2010)).  In democratic societies, voters have the choice of voting 
politicians out of power. In less fully democratic societies, and in between voting cycles 
in democratic societies, the public has other means of influencing their agent’s behavior. 
The mechanisms include exerting influence (Jain (2001)). To be a member of NPC or 
CPPCC, one needs to be voted by local population, so these private entrepreneurs are 
more likely to promote employees and pay more in order to get the votes. 
 
Several studies find that political connections are valuable, as ties with the government 
help firms to gain comparative advantages, which enhance firm performance and value 
(Fan et al., (2008); Fisman, (2001); Goldman et al., (2009)). The advantages of political 
connections include access to key resources, including bank loans (Yu et al. (2008); 
Charumilind et al., (2006)), a higher IPO offering price (Francis et al. (2009)) and tax 
benefits (Faccio (2006)). Husnan (2001) proposes the benefits to the firms are in the form 
of capital funding. In his research, the connected firms can easily raise debt financing by 
obtaining “lending memos” form politicians. Khwaja and Mian (2005) also show that 
politically affiliated firms enjoy increased access to capital from financial institutions. 
The benefits from the political ties help the firm face fewer budget constraints, and they 
are less sensitive to competitors’ pressure than firms without political connections 
(Boubakri et al. (2012)). Wu et al. (2012) investigate the performance of privately-owned 
firms, they find that politically connected managers in the private firms are more like to 
enjoy the tax benefits. In order to promote employment, Chinese government also 
provides tax benefits to the private firms according to the Chinses tax policy. Notice on 
supporting and promoting employment-related tax policies (2018)8 states that if private 
firms expand the new employments, sign a labor contract with a term of more than one 
year and paid social insurance premiums in accordance with the law, private firms can 
 
8http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/chinatax/n810341/n810765/n812161/201010/c1084716/content.htmlRetrieved 
on December 21, 2019. 
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get deduction on related tax (the business tax, city maintenance and construction tax, 
education surcharge, and corporate income tax) in sequence according to the actual 
number of employees hired within 3 years. Moreover, No17 in Employment Promotion 
Law of the People's Republic of China states (original in Mandarin, my translation 
follows): “government encourages firms to expand employment, supports the 
employment of the unemployed and the disabled, and grants preferential tax treatment”. 
No10 states that “all levels of government and relevant departments give recognition and 
rewards to firms and individuals who have made outstanding achievements in promoting 
employment”. Cheng. (2014) finds that actively fulfilling social responsibilities can help 
firms face fewer financing constraints. When considering the benefits that private 
companies can get by following the government policies, I propose that private firms 
with political connections will hire more employees and provide more benefits. Therefore, 
political connections are positively related to firm performance. 
 
H1a: Politically connected firms have higher level of employees’ benefits compared with 
those of other firms.  
H2a: Private firms with political connection will hire more employees than firms that are 
not politically connected.  
H3a: The political connections in a private firm are positively related to the firm 
performance 
 
However, the impact of political connections on firm performance is still not conclusive. 
Other research studies find that political connections have a negative effect on firms’ 
performance. Su and Fung (2013) show that the political connections have a negative 
effect on firm value due to related-party transactions. Ling et al. (2016) examine the 
influence of firms’ political connections on external financing, firm investment and 
financial performance. They find that firms with strong political ties are financed with 
more long-term bank loans and are more likely to overinvest. Based on a sample of 
47countries, Faccio (2006) reports that politically connected firms underperform their 
non-connected peers on an ex ante basis, even though political ties provide a number of 
benefits. Fan et al. (2007) find that listed firms in China with politically connected CEOs 
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underperform those without connected CEOs. Boubakri et al. (2008) report that 
politically connected firms exhibit poor accounting performance compared to their non-
connected counterparts based on sample of 245 privatized firms headquartered in 41 
countries. In addition, from the perspective of business objectives the goal of the firm is 
profit maximization or value maximization. Employees’ benefits are a big part of labor 
costs. Higher labor costs (higher wage rates and employee benefits) make workers better 
off, but they can reduce companies’ profits (Hamermesh (2014)). The aim of 
liberalization process is to reduce the government’s intervention, the implementation 
process itself requires a high level of state intervention (Jain. (2001)). Government can 
transfer all or part of the political objectives to politically connected private firms, make 
the firms achieve political goals and ignore the t goal of value maximization. This will 
damage the enterprise efficiency and profit (Shleifer. (1998)).  The political connections 
may increase the corruptions and corruption has significant distributional implications. 
Given its negative efficiency implications, corruption should be considered harmful to 
both growth and equity (Jain (2001)). Therefore, I propose three more hypotheses based 
on the negative effects (costs) of the political connections: 
 
H1b: Politically connected firms have low level of employees’ benefits.  
H2b: Private firms with political connection will hire fewer employees 
H3b: The political connections in a private firm are negatively related to the firm 
performance. 
 
In recent years, employee satisfaction has become a popular and interesting field in 
finance research. The primary source of satisfaction is assumed to be the employees’ 
compensation and benefits (Meyer et al. (2001)). The compensation and benefits always 
consist of different insurances, which could provide benefits for the employer and the 
employee. Efficiency of Salary Theory predicts that firms with higher levels of pay will 
have higher employee performance. Levine (1992) found a positive relationship between 
employee salaries and various measures of productivity. The high level of a benefits 
package will lead to high employee satisfaction. Best (2008) finds strong evidence that 
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satisfied workers are associated with greater levels of productivity, and the firms with 
highly satisfied employees have a significantly higher value.  
 
The private firm needs to ensure the maximization of firm profits or the maximization of 
value. Therefore, it needs to make sure that the employees have the same goal as the firm 
(Jianxin (2011)). Reasonable employee welfare is important for improving labor relations. 
It is not just insurance for the employees, but it is also a way to align the employees’ 
interest with the firm value. In the context of China, it implies that the higher the firm 
social responsibility commitments, the greater the support by the government. The 
government will also provide more resources.  
 
H4: In politically connected firms, employees’ benefits have a positive effect on firm 
performance. 
3. Data and Descriptive statistics 
3.1 Data sample 
 
This paper studies the relationship between political connections in Chinese private firm, 
employments and firm performance. Specifically, I investigate whether politically 
connected firms provide higher level of benefits and hire more people than firms that are 
not politically connected. I also investigate the relationship between political connections 
and firm value. This study includes the listed private firms in Chinese A-share market 
(Shenzhen and Shanghai stock market) from 2008 to 2017. The financial statements, 
executives, shareholders and other related information of listed private firms come from 
Csmar database. The political connections data is manually collected from the firm's 
annual reports in Csmar database. In terms of sample selection, I exclude special 
treatment stocks (ST and *ST), because the firm with ST or *ST tags suffer losses for 
two consecutive years or more and enter delisting procedures. Firms with ST or *ST tags 
also have incomplete financial reports, so the data is not complete. Therefore, I drop them. 
I also drop the financial firms because these firms have different accounting standards 
from others. Moreover, I exclude the firms in mining and power industries, because most 
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of these firms are monopoly (Laixin (2010)). I require firms in the sample to have at least 
three years of complete financial data. After the above screening steps, the final sample I 
use for the study includes 1,583 private listed firms in 15 industries with 10,331 firm year 
observations.   
 
In the literature on political connections, the main approach is to measure political 
connections of the firm’s executives with the government. Faccio (2006) considers a firm 
as having political connections based on, whether executives or major shareholders are 
members of parliament or government officials, whether they have close ties with senior 
government officials or political parties. Based on relevant studies, I consider the political 
connections of the firms with respect to the key executives (chairman and general 
manager). The General Manager is elected by and responsible to the board of directors. In 
the literature, the General Manager is often regarded as equivalent to the CEO of US 
firms (Fan et al., (2007)). These two positions generally have the most significant impact 
on firm decisions (Yu et al., (2008); Liu et al., (2011)). I also stratify the political 
connections into an official connection and a representative connection. If the key 
executives of the private firms who are serving (or have served as) in party committees, 
government, institutions of the National People's Congress, courts, and procuratorates 
currently or previously, I consider the key executives to have the official connection, and 
the variable PC1 equals 1, and 0 otherwise. Moreover, the representative connection will 
be considered when the key executives of the firm are serving (or have served) as 
representatives of the National People's Congress and CPPCC members. If connected, the 
variables PC2 equals 1, and zero otherwise. Therefore, the political connections of a firm 
are based on the PC1 and PC2. Therefore, if the key executives are connected with the 
politics, no matter the official or the representative connection, the firm will be 
considered as having the political connections.  From the Table 1, the key executives of 
the 10,311 firm years used in this paper, there are 4,114 observations with political 
connections, which is approximately 39.90% of the total. There are 1,002 (9.72%) 
official connections and 3,558 (34.51%) representative connections in the sample. The 
proportion of firms with political connections in each year ranges from 30.72% to 
46.71%, the proportion increase slightly from 2008 to 2012 and decreases slightly from 
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2012 to 2017. The official connection proportion ranges from 6.38% to 13.08%, the 
representative connection ranged from 27.39% to 40.40%. Moreover, there are more 
representative connections than official ones in the private firms in China. 
 
The employees’ benefits are a very important way to motivate and compensate the 
employees. The employees’ benefits data are manually collected from the financial 
statements data. In terms of employees’ benefits levels, I use social welfare (or 
mandatory benefits) including employment welfare, housing fund and social insurance. 
Social insurance includes medical insurance, endowment insurance, unemployment 
insurance, maternity insurance, work-related injury insurance. Education benefits is also 
a benefit that firms provide to employees. But this kind of benefit is not provided by all 
firms, so I exclude it. This study investigates the employees’ benefits at three levels: 
industry level, firm level and regional level. Variable EB1 is the employment benefits at 
the firm level, it equals to average benefits divided by average operating income. And the 
EB2 is the industry level employees’ benefits (average Benefits / average annual 
benefits). The employment benefits at regional level (EB3) are average benefits divided 
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2008  413 166 0.402 54 0.131 132 0.320 
2009 518 207 0.400 53 0.102 172 0.332 
2010 748 336 0.449 85 0.114 286 0.382 
2011 1014 471 0.464 125 0.123 401 0.395 
2012 1141 533 0.467 136 0.119 461 0.404 
2013 1154 535 0.464 140 0.121 456 0.395 
2014 1235 550 0.445 121 0.098 486 0.394 
2015 1322 444 0.336 87 0.066 398 0.301 
2016 1380 424 0.307 88 0.064 378 0.274 
2017 1386 448 0.323 113 0.082 388 0.280 
Total 10311 4114 0.399 1002 0.097 3558 0.345 
 
This research study uses Tobin’s Q as an estimate of firm performance. Tobin’s Q is the 
ratio of the market value of a firm’s assets to the replacement cost of its assets; it is a 
widely accepted measure of firm performance. As we do not know the replacement cost 
of total assets, Tobin’s Q is measured as the market value of total assets deflated by the 
book value of total assets. Thus it is calculated as the ratio of the market value of equity 
plus the book value of total debts to the book value of total assets. I use the control 
variables based on the study of Jianxin (2018), and the Table 2 provides the definitions of 
the control variables that I use in my study. These variables include the basic 
characteristics of the firm and the firm’s governance characteristics. Size, the log of total 
assets, is used in different models to control for the size effect. I also include industry 
dummies in the models to control for the industry effect. The industry classification is 
based on the industry codes of the China Securities Regulatory Commission. The data 
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Table 2 Control Variable definition and calculation method 
 
Control Variable Symbol Calculation Method 
The size of the firm Size Log of total assets 
The financial leverage Lev Total debts/total assets 
CEO Duality Dual 
Equals 1, if the firm general manager and 
chairman is one person, otherwise 0 
Board of Directors 
Independence 
Ind 
Number of Independent Directors / Total 
number of Boards. 
Separation of ownership and 
control level 
PD 
Actual controller's control ratio minus 
ownership ratio 
Largest shareholder ratio FSH 
The shareholding ratio of the largest 
shareholder 
Top ten shareholders’ shares Zindex 
Sum of the % shareholding of the top ten 
shareholders 
Executives Age Age The average age of the key executives. 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
The table 3 provides the basic information about the sample at fiscal year, industry and 
regional levels. The number of private firms of China increases dramatically from 2008 
to 2017. There are 413 listed private firms in 2008, and it increases to 1,386 in 2017. 
With the development of Chinese market, there are more listed private firms in the 
economy. Manufacturing industry is the main part of a country’s economy, and it  is also 
the foundation of the country’s economy. China is the world’s largest manufacturing 
country and the data shows that most of the private firms are in the manufacturing 
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industry. 1,243 private firms are from the manufacturing industry; they are 78.5% of the 
total number of listed firms. Development of the economy in different regions of China 
has been uneven, for the northeast and northwest part of china, the pace of development 
has been slow, therefore the private firms are less numerous here than in the rest of the 
country.  Only 4.9% and 3.3% of the total number of firms are located in these regions. 
Moreover 46.9% of the private firms in my sample are located in the eastern part of 
China.  
 
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics. It shows that the political connections are 
widespread in Chinese private firms; it is 39.9% of the total sample with standard 
deviation 0.49. The representative connection (34.51%) is more prevalent than 9.72% 
official connection.  The sum of total number of representative and official connection is 
greater than the number of political connections due to some firms having both 
representative and official connections. For the employees’ benefits, the minimum at firm 
level is almost 0, and the maximum is 2.43. At industry level the minimum is 0.007, the 
maximum is 8.99, and at the regional level the minimum is almost 0 and the maximum is 
3.66. There is a big difference among different benefits levels. The mean for the 
percentage of independent board of directors’ members is 37%, which shows the 
independent director percentage meets the official requirements of 1/3; it also means only 
these firms in my sample have established a relatively good independent board of 
directors. Zindex is the sum of the shareholding ratio of the top ten shareholders, the 
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Table 3 Profiles of the Sample Companies N= 1583 
 
Sample Characteristics Number of firms % 
Panel A: Year      
2008 413 4.0% 
2009 518 5.0% 
2010 748 7.3% 
2011 1014 9.8% 
2012 1141 11.1% 
2013 1154 11.2% 
2014 1235 12.0% 
2015 1322 12.8% 
2016 1380 13.4% 
2017 1386 13.4% 
Panel B:  Industry     
Primary industry 26 1.6% 
manufacturing 1243 78.5% 
Construction  43 2.7% 
Wholesale retail 75 4.7% 
Transportation warehousing 17 1.1% 
Accommodation 5 0.3% 
IT 8 0.5% 
Real estate 67 4.2% 
Business 21 1.3% 
Research 15 0.9% 
Public environmental protection 22 1.4% 
Resident service 1 0.1% 
Health 4 0.3% 
Cultural 16 1.0% 
Complex 20 1.3% 
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Panel C: Region      
Central China 130 8.2% 
East China 742 46.9% 
North China 162 10.2% 
North East China 78 4.9% 
North West China 53 3.3% 
South China 315 19.9% 
South West China 103 6.5% 
 
 
Table 4 Data descriptive summary 
 
Variable Obs Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
PC 10311 0.000 1.000 0.399 0.490 
PC1 10311 0.000 1.000 0.097 0.296 
PC2 10311 0.000 1.000 0.345 0.475 
EB1 10311 0.000 2.439 0.016 0.031 
EB2 10311 0.008 8.999 0.965 0.685 
EB3 10311 0.001 3.661 0.141 0.139 
Tobin’s Q 10311 0.666 9.998 3.079 1.685 
Size 10311 18.174 26.613 22.343 0.900 
En 10311 1.176 5.303 3.190 0.498 
Lev 10311 0.007 1.256 0.386 0.203 
Dual 10311 0.000 1.000 0.373 0.484 
Ind 10311 0.143 0.667 0.374 0.053 
PD 10311 -0.052 0.533 0.058 0.082 
FSH 10311 0.034 0.900 0.333 0.140 
Zindex 10311 0.001 0.960 0.541 0.193 
Age 10311 25.000 88.000 50.644 8.012 
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Table 5 provides the correlation matrix. The political connections and representative 
connection have negative relationship with all levels of employees’ benefits, and it is 
significant at 1% level of significance. But for the official connection, it is only 
significant at 5% level for the industry level employment benefits. All kind of political 
connections have a negative relationship with the Tobin’s Q at 1% and 5% levels of 
significance. 
 
Based on whether the firm has political connections or not, the sample is divided into two 
categories, one is the firms with political connections, the other is the firms without 
political connections. I compare the means of different variables of these two types of 
firms and the results are presented in Table 6. It shows that the mean of employees’ 
benefits at three levels in the firms, which have political connections, are smaller than the 
mean of firms without political connections, so the firms with political connections 
provides fewer benefits to the employees. Moreover, mean of the Tobin’s Q for the firms 
with political connections is also smaller than it is for the firms without political 
connections. The firms that establish political connections will not improve  the firm 
performance. However, the mean of employee numbers has the opposite results. This 
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Table 5 Correlation Analysis of all variables 
                                                                                                                   




  PC PC1 PC2 EB1 EB2 EB3 EN Tobin’s Q Size Lev Dual Ind PD FSH Zindex 
PC 1                            
PC1 0.403*** 1              
PC2 0.891*** 0.069*** 1                         
EB1 -0.028*** 0.012 -0.043*** 1                       
EB2 -0.081*** -0.025** -0.079*** 0.133*** 1                     
EB3 -0.035*** 0.011 -0.047*** 0.148*** 0.744*** 1                   
EN 0.017* -0.016* 0.028*** -0.073*** -0.184*** -0.248*** 1                 
Tobin’s 
Q 
-0.034*** -0.025** -0.032*** 0.043*** 0.003 -0.060*** -0.291*** 1               
Size -0.046*** -0.044*** -0.029*** -0.101*** 0.093*** -0.011 0.490*** 0.200*** 1             
Lev -0.040*** 0.039*** -0.072*** -0.064*** 0.003 0.050*** 0.278*** -0.393*** 0.131*** 1           
Dual 0.020** -0.022** 0.028*** 0.002 -0.021** -0.037*** -0.048*** 0.115*** -0.021** -0.099*** 1         
Ind 0 -0.015 -0.001 0.007 -0.007 -0.024** -0.060*** 0.069*** 0.001 -0.029*** 0.114*** 1       
PD -0.016* 0.046*** -0.036*** -0.017* 0.037*** 0.055*** 0.153*** -0.145*** 0.065*** 0.150*** -0.130*** -0.109*** 1     
FSH 0.044*** 0.034*** 0.067*** -0.052*** -0.013 0.005 0.082*** 0.032*** 0.082*** -0.01 0.041*** 0.036*** 0.230*** 1   
Zindex 0.065*** 0.034*** 0.097*** -0.062*** -0.028*** -0.069*** 0.017*   0.157*** 0.106*** -0.159*** 0.067*** 0.028*** -0.016* 0.409*** 1 
Age 0.166*** 0.126*** 0.134*** 0.012 0.014 -0.034*** 0.026*** 0.013 0.031*** -0.096*** -0.039*** -0.032*** 0.038*** -0.003 0.040*** 
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Table 6 Mean comparison T Test 
 
Variables 
Mean of Political 
connection firms 
Mean of Non-Political 
connection firms T-Value 
EB1 0.015 0.016 3.267*** 
EB2 0.897 1.010 8.299*** 
EB3 0.135 0.145 3.467*** 
En 3.200 3.180 1.810* 
Tobin’s Q 3.009 3.125 3.486*** 
*** Represent significance at the 1% level. ** Represent significance at the 5% levels. * Represent significance at the 10% level. 
4. Regression Analysis 
 
4.1 Political connections and employees’ benefits 
 
In this paper, I use social welfare (or mandatory benefits), including employment welfare, 
housing fund and social insurance at three different levels as the measure of the 
employees’ benefits.  In order to test the relation between the political connections and 
the employees’ benefits, I use the regression model (1) as follow: 
 
Eb = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝐶 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜀                                                   (1) 
 
The dependent variable is Eb (Employees’ benefits), which measures employees’ benefits 
and the independent variable is the political connections. The control variables include 
firm size, financial leverage, Dual, Indep, PD, Zindex, and Age. These variables are as 
defined in Table 2. Moreover, I add the year, industry and region dummies. I use a panel 
dataset; therefore, I use the Hausman Test to determine if I should use Random Effects or 
the Fixed Effects in the regression analysis. When the Hausman Test results of the 
regression for the model between political connections and firm level benefits shows that 
p>0.05, I use the random effects regression and when the other Hausman test results 
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show that p<0.05, the regression model chosen is the fixed-effects one. I run the above 




The results are presented in Table 7. The political connections (PC) is negatively 
correlated with the employees’ benefits of private firms at the 1% level of significance, 
which means the employees’ benefits in politically connected firm are low. It is generally 
believed that the politically connected firms have a strong sense of responsibility to the 
society and they will improve the employees’ benefits to show this responsibility and 
establish their reputation as a socially responsible firm.. However, the results show that 
the politically connected firm does not provide more benefits to their employees due to 
the government intervention. In order to get more benefits from government, they try to 
establish the political connections, but they usually ignore the employees’ benefits. This 
supports hypothesis…………..  
 
 The firm needs to take more responsibility for the employment, and the government pays 
more attention to the “Quantity” rather than the “Quality” of employment. Secondly, the 
employees’ benefits are closely related to the firm performance. Firm have the ability to 
undertake more social responsibilities when they are doing well financially. But some 
firm may not be doing well and to curry favor with the party they cannot assume the 
responsibility for the cost of employees’ benefits before they take advantage of the 
political connections. Employees’ benefits are the most fundamental responsibility of the 
firm; the outsiders cannot easily observe the reputation effect generated by these benefits. 
Therefore, the firm is more willing to use resources on charitable donations and other 
altruistic acts and does not assume more fundamental firm social responsibilities. 
 
In addition, I find that the negative correlation between representative political 
connections (PC2) is higher than that of official political connections (PC1), although the 
relationship between official political connections and employees’ benefits is not 
significant under regional and firm level. This shows that the key managers who have 
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official experience show greater ability to understand and handle relevant policies, 
therefore these official connections protect the employees’ benefits system, and they tend 
to provide favorable employee welfare system, and restrain the firm from reducing 
welfare expenditures by controlling costs. 
 
Table 7 Regression of Model (1) 
 
Eb = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝐶 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜀     
 
Variables 
Eb1 Eb2 Eb3 
Company level benefits Industry level benefits Regional level benefits 








(-0.001) (-0.014) (-0.003) 
PC1 
  0.000     -0.061***     -0.007   
  (-0.001)     (-0.023)     (-0.004)   






(-0.001) (-0.014) (-0.003) 
Size 
0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
(-0.000) (-0.000) (-0.000) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) 
Lev 
-0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.057 -0.054 -0.063* -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
(-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.037) (-0.037) (-0.037) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.007) 
Dual 
0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.010 -0.012 -0.010 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.014) (-0.014) (-0.014) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) 
Ind 
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.068 0.069 0.061 -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 
(-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.126) (-0.127) (-0.126) (-0.024) (-0.024) (-0.024) 
PD 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.247*** 0.269*** 0.235*** 0.031* 0.034** 0.030* 
(-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.087) (-0.087) (-0.087) (-0.017) (-0.017) (-0.017) 
FSH 
-0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.048 -0.064 -0.040 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
(-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.055) (-0.055) (-0.055) (-0.011) (-0.011) (-0.011) 
Zindex 
-0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.118*** -0.133*** -0.113*** -0.041*** -0.043*** -0.040*** 
(-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.039) (-0.039) (-0.039) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) 
Age 
0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.002* 0.001 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-0.000) (-0.000) (-0.000) (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.000) (-0.000) (-0.000) 
Constant 
0.085*** 0.084*** 0.085*** -0.670*** -0.710*** -0.692*** -0.237*** -0.229*** -0.236*** 
(-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.185) (-0.185) (-0.185) (-0.043) (-0.043) (-0.043) 
Observations 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 
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*** Represent significance at the 1% level. ** Represent significance at the 5% levels. * Represent significance at the 
10% level. 
 
In terms of control variables, the size of the firm is significantly positively related with 
the level of employees’ benefits, indicating that large firms have sufficient resources to 
protect the basic welfare of employeeThe equity concentration level (FSH) and the 
Zindex are negatively related with the employee welfare level, indicating that the major 
shareholders are more likely to use the profits to develop the production and operation 
activities, while neglecting employees benefits and satisfaction. 
 
4.2 Political connections and number of employees 
 
 As discussed above controlling unemployment and promoting employment has always 
been one of the most important goals of Chinese governments at all levels. The 
government has the motivation to require firms to solve the employment pressure. 
Therefore, I measure the implementation of social responsibility by politically affiliated 
firms from the perspective of employee numbers.  I use regression model (2) is to 
examine the relationship between the number of employees and the political connections. 
I run the En (the log of employees’ number) regression model for three subsamples based 
on political connections categories in fixed-effect regression. The coefficient α1  is 
expected to be positive to validate my hypothesis 2. 
 
En = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝐶 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜀                                                   (2) 
 
Table 8 provides the results of the regression analysis. The coefficient of the political 
connections (PC) is significantly positive at the 5% level, indicating that the politically 
connected firms  employ more employees and assume employment responsibilities. 
These results are consistent with the hypothesis 2a; politically connected firms employ 
more employees than non-affiliated firms. This result may also explain why politically 
connected firms have low level of employees’ benefits. In fact, politically connected 
firms have taken on the social goals that the government has passed on.   
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Table 8 Regression results of Model( 2) 
En = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝐶 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜀 
Variables 
En 






 -0.024*  





0.332*** 0.332*** 0.332*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Lev 
0.738*** 0.740*** 0.739*** 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Dual 
-0.022*** -0.021*** -0.022*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ind 
-0.276*** -0.274*** -0.275*** 
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
PD 
0.429*** 0.429*** 0.433*** 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
FSH 
0.072** 0.069** 0.070** 
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
Zindex 
-0.041* -0.037* -0.044** 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Age 
0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 
-4.450*** -4.463*** -4.444*** 
(0.122) (0.122) (0.122) 
Observations 10311 10311 10311 
*** Represent significance at the 1% level. ** Represent significance at the 5% levels. * Represent significance at the 10% level.. 
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However, the private firm is just helping the government to decrease the pressure of 
employment in the number of the employees. It is not solving the employment pressure in 
quality. I also find that only firms with representative connections hire more employees. 
On the contrary, the official firms do not hire more employees. This supports previous 
results; the official connection will pay more attention to guarantee the quality of 
employment. The quality of employment means the benefits and compensation for the 
employees.  Moreover, in terms of control variables, the size of the firm is significantly 
positively related with the level of employees’ benefits, indicating that large firms have 
sufficient resources to hire more employees. 
4.3 Political connections and firm performance 
 
The regression analysis above shows that the political connections do not provide 
employees with a high level of welfare. Does this behavior affect the firm performance? 
The government's role in a private firm has always been a double-edged sword.  
Politically connected firms can usually obtain preferential policies and resources to 
promote the development of firms. Therefore, I next examine the relationship between 
political connections, employees’ benefits, and firm value. 
 
Following existing literature, I use Tobin’s Q as an estimate of firm performance in this 
paper. Tobin’s Q is a widely accepted measure of firm financial performance. The region, 
industry and year dummies are also included in the model. I use the model (3) to examine 
the relationship among firm performance, political connections and employees’ benefits. 
I run the regressions with the control variables included in Model (1). In this model the 
estimated coefficient of political connections β1  estimates the impact of the political 
connections on firm performance and the pc ∗ Eb represents the impact of employees’ 
benefits in politically connected firm on the firm performance. As discussed in the 
hypotheses section, I expect β1 and the estimated coefficient of pc ∗ Eb to be positive. 
 
 
TobinQ = β0 + β1pc + ∑ pc ∗ Eb + Controls + ℰ                 (3) 
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The Hausman test results show p<0.05, so the model I use to examine the relation among 
firm performance, political connections and employees’ benefits includes fixed effects. I 
run the above regression model for nine subsamples based on the benefits level and 
political connections categories. 
 
The results show that political association (PC) and firm value (Tobin’s Q) are 
significantly negatively correlated at 1% level of significance in table 9. This shows that 
political connections impair the value of firm. The results are not consistent with my third 
hypothesis that the political connections in private firm are positively related to the firm 
performance. The reason for the opposite result may be that the establishment and 
maintenance of political connections are huge costs for private firms, and these costs 
exceed the benefits the firms get from the political connections. First of all, political 
connections increase the instances of government intervention. The government often 
intervenes in the operations of firms to achieve political goals, and the degree of 
intervention increases when political connections bring a closer relationship. Therefore, 
the politically connected firms tend to achieve the political goals instead of their business 
goals, which hurt efficiency and profits of the private firms (Shleifer and Vishny (1998)). 
Then political connections may increase agency costs. In modern firms, the conflict of 
interest between manager and owners of a firm will lead to agency problem. The political 
connections make the agency problem between the manager and the firm turns into the 
agency problem between the government and the firm. The key managers who are 
directly appointed by the government may lack managerial skills. They do not know the 
market and have no idea about the operations of the firm. This will make relationship 
between political connections and the firm value negative. In addition, the representative 
executives blindly cater to the demands of the government and carry out other activities 
that are detrimental to the goal of value maximization. 
 
However, the results show that the coefficient of all the political connections interacted 
with employees’ benefits (PC*Eb) is positive at 1% and 10% levels of significance. Thus, 
my hypothesis 4 is supported by the results, even though the coefficient of representative  




Table 9 Regression results of Model (3) 
TobinQ = β0 + β1pc + ∑ pc ∗ Eb + Controls + ℰ   
Variables 
Tobin's Q 
Company level benefits Industry level benefits Regional level benefits 
PC 
-0.200***     -0.138***     -0.154***     
(-0.035)     (0.040)     (0.034)     
PC1 
  0.092     -0.047     -0.036   
  (0.056)     (0.076)     (0.060)   
PC2 
    -0.312***     -0.185***     -0.200*** 
    (0.038)     (0.042)     (-0.035) 
PC*EB 
7.748***     0.055*     0.489***     
(-1.386)     (0.032)     (0.140)     
PC1*EB 
  3.727*     0.219***     1.316***   
  (1.962)     (0.0659)     (0.263)   
PC2*EB 











0.245*** 0.239*** 0.248*** 0.237*** 0.238*** 0.242*** 0.236*** 0.238*** 0.240*** 
(-0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (-0.019) 
Lev 
-3.147*** -3.182*** -3.154*** -3.174*** -3.191*** -3.183*** -3.171*** -3.190*** -3.182*** 
(-0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (-0.075) 
Dual 
0.193*** 0.190*** 0.194*** 0.192*** 0.191*** 0.193*** 0.190*** 0.189*** 0.193*** 
(-0.029) (-0.029) (-0.029) (-0.029) (-0.029) (-0.029) (-0.029) (-0.029) (-0.029) 
Ind 
1.089*** 1.102*** 1.096*** 1.121*** 1.107*** 1.114*** 1.125*** 1.102*** 1.118*** 
(-0.255) (0.256) (0.255) (0.256) (0.256) (0.255) (0.256) (0.255) (-0.255) 
PD 
-1.860*** -1.855*** -1.879*** -1.851*** -1.855*** -1.879*** -1.849*** -1.856*** -1.878*** 
(-0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (-0.176) 
FSH 
0.310*** 0.299*** 0.316*** 0.276** 0.298*** 0.286** 0.276** 0.301*** 0.286** 
(-0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (-0.113) 
Zindex 
0.541*** 0.520*** 0.554*** 0.537*** 0.515*** 0.557*** 0.542*** 0.517*** 0.559*** 
(-0.083) (0.082) (0.083) (0.083) (0.082) (0.083) (0.083) (0.082) (-0.083) 
Age 
-0.004** -0.005*** -0.003* -0.003** -0.005*** -0.003** -0.004** -0.006*** -0.003** 
(-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.002) 
Constant 
-1.809*** -1.644*** -1.876*** -1.641*** -1.630*** -1.732*** -1.598*** -1.630*** -1.705*** 
(-0.452) (0.452) (0.452) (0.453) (0.452) (0.453) (0.453) (0.451) (-0.452) 
Observations 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 
*** Represent significance at the 1% level. ** Represent significance at the 5% levels. * Represent significance at the 10% level.. 
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connection interacted with employees’ benefits at industry and regional level are not 
significant. Therefore, the improvement of employees’ benefits can significantly improve 
the negative impact of political connections on firm value. I further investigate the type 
of the political connections and their effects on firm value. Only the regression 
coefficients of representative connection (PC2) are significantly negative relate to 
Tobin’s Q, and the regression coefficient of official political association (PC1) is not 
significant. The results also show that interaction of official connection and employees’ 
benefits (PC1*Eb1) are lower than representative connection (PC2*Eb1) at firm level, 
indicating that the representative executives improve the performance of the firm by 
improving employee welfare. In terms of control variables, the firm Size, Dual, Ind, FSH, 
Zindex have a positive relationship with the firm performance. The interesting thing is 
that the key executive’ age is negatively related to the Tobin’s Q, that is to say the young 
CEO will improve the firm performance. 
5. Robustness Tests 
 
In order to test the reliability of using employees’ benefits that only include social 
benefits and firm level benefits, I conduct a number of  of robustness tests. These tests 
use the compensation as the indicator of employees’ benefits. I use two variables; Wage1 
is the logarithm of the amount of the cash paid to employees in the cash flow statement 
divided by the number of employees in the current year. Moreover, Wage2 is the ratio of 
the average cash income of employees to the average operating income. The results are 
presented in Table 10.   
 
Then I use clustered standard errors along two dimensions to do the robustness test for all 
the models. This approach allows for correlations among different firms in the same year 
and different years for the same firm for my large panel data. Table 11 presents the 
results for the relationship between employees’ benefits and political connections. It 
shows that the political connections (PC) is negatively related with the employees’ 
benefits of private firms at the 1% level of significance, which means the employees’ 
benefits in politically connected firm are low. The results for official connection and 
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representative connection are consistent with results reported in section 4. These results 
show that key managers who have official experience show greater ability to understand 
and handle relevant policies, therefore 
 
Table 10 Robustness test of Employment Benefits Model (1) 
 
Eb = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝐶 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜀 
Variables Wage1 Wage2 
PC 
-0.0278***     -0.0205***     
-0.00438     -0.00649     
PC1 
  -0.0301***     -0.0181*   
  -0.00715     -0.0106   
PC2 
    -0.0241***     -0.0257*** 
    -0.0045     -0.00666 
Size 
0.0472*** 0.0466*** 0.0472*** 0.0396*** 0.0400*** 0.0395*** 
-0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.00429 -0.00429 -0.00429 
Lev 
0.0408*** 0.0425*** 0.0392*** -0.416*** -0.415*** -0.418*** 
-0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.0162 -0.0163 -0.0162 
Dual 
-0.003 -0.00366 -0.00313 0.0345*** 0.0340*** 0.0346*** 
-0.00441 -0.00441 -0.00441 -0.00653 -0.00653 -0.00653 
Ind 
0.0318 0.0303 0.03 0.124** 0.123** 0.123** 
-0.0397 -0.0398 -0.0398 -0.0588 -0.0589 -0.0588 
PD 
0.00362 0.0129 0.00214 -0.106*** -0.0997** -0.109*** 
-0.0274 -0.0274 -0.0274 -0.0405 -0.0405 -0.0405 
FSH 
-0.0184 -0.0215 -0.0165 -0.161*** -0.163*** -0.159*** 
-0.0174 -0.0174 -0.0174 -0.0257 -0.0257 -0.0257 
Zindex 
0.0307** 0.0256** 0.0307** -0.0179 -0.0217 -0.0162 
-0.0128 -0.0128 -0.0128 -0.019 -0.0189 -0.019 
Age 
-0.000207 -0.000362 -0.000315 0.0006 0.000464 0.00059 
-0.000271 -0.00027 -0.00027 -0.000401 -0.000399 -0.000399 
Constant 
3.574*** 3.588*** 3.577*** -0.205** -0.194** -0.207** 
-0.0652 -0.0652 -0.0652 -0.0965 -0.0965 -0.0965 
Observations 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 
*** Represent significance at the 1% level. ** Represent significance at the 5% levels. * Represent significance at the 10% level.. 
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these official connections protect the employees’ benefits system, and they tend to 








Eb1 Eb2 Eb3 
Company level benefits Industry level benefits Regional level benefits 
PC -0.002***     -0.108***     -0.007**     
(-0.001)     (-0.02)     (-0.003)     
PC1   0.001     -0.059*     0.004   
  (-0.001)     (-0.03)     (-0.005)   
PC2     -0.003***     -0.109***     -0.010** 
    (-0.001)     (-0.029)     (-0.004) 
Size 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.071*** 0.073*** 0.072*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.012) (-0.011) (-0.012) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) 
Lev -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** 0.071*** 0.066*** 0.079*** 0.019 0.019 0.018 
(-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.027) (-0.025) (-0.028) (-0.032) (-0.032) (-0.032) 
Dual 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.016* -0.019* -0.016 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
(-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.005) 
Ind 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.016 -0.015 -0.022 -0.042* -0.041* -0.042* 
(-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.113) (-0.115) (-0.114) (-0.023) (-0.023) (-0.023) 
PD 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.271*** 0.295*** 0.259*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.066*** 
(-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.086) (-0.089) (-0.085) (-0.019) (-0.019) (-0.02) 
FSH -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.054 -0.071 -0.048 0.028*** 0.028** 0.029*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (-0.063) (-0.064) (-0.062) (-0.011) (-0.011) (-0.01) 
Zindex -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.112** -0.127*** -0.108** -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.049*** 
(-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.047) (-0.046) (-0.05) (-0.015) (-0.015) (-0.015) 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002** 0.001 0.002* -0.000* -0.001** -0.000* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.088*** -0.574** -0.612** -0.593** 0.237*** 0.233*** 0.237*** 
  (-0.019) (-0.019) (-0.018) (-0.272) (-0.25) (-0.275) (-0.071) (-0.069) (-0.071) 
Observations 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 
*** Represent significance at the 1% level. ** Represent significance at the 5% levels. * Represent significance at the 10% level... 
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In order to see the results of the relationship between number of employees and political 
connections are reliable or not, Table 12 provides the robustness test results of the 
regression analysis that uses clustered standard errors along two dimensions. It shows 
that the coefficient of the political connections (PC) is significantly positive at the 5% 
level, indicating that the politically connected firms employ more employees and assume 
employment responsibilities. These results are consistent with the hypothesis 2.  




The number of Employees 
PC 
0.045**     
(-0.02)     
PC1 
  -0.02   
  (-0.029)   
PC2 
    0.059*** 
    (-0.018) 
Size 
0.253*** 0.251*** 0.253*** 
(-0.017) (-0.017) (-0.017) 
Lev 
0.505*** 0.506*** 0.509*** 
(-0.176) (-0.174) (-0.175) 
Dual 
-0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
(-0.028) (-0.029) (-0.028) 
Ind 
-0.425*** -0.426*** -0.421*** 
(-0.107) (-0.104) (-0.108) 
PD 
0.485*** 0.482*** 0.493*** 
(-0.073) (-0.077) (-0.072) 
FSH 
0.12 0.124 0.115 
(-0.082) (-0.08) (-0.083) 
Zindex 
-0.034 -0.029 -0.038 
(-0.074) (-0.077) (-0.074) 
Age 
0.001 0.002 0.001 
(-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.001) 
Constant 
-2.633*** -2.606*** -2.629*** 
(-0.391) (-0.394) (-0.383) 
Observations 10311 10311 10311 
*** Represent significance at the 1% level. ** Represent significance at the 5% levels. * Represent significance at the 10% level.. 
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We can see that political connections (PC) and firm value (Tobin’s Q) are significantly 
negatively related in table 12, even though the level of significance at industry and 
regional level is significant at 5% level of significance, it shows that political connections 
impair the value of firm.  The coefficients of representative connection (PC2) are still 
statistically significantly negatively related with Tobin’s Q, and the regression coefficient 
of official political association (PC1) is not significant. The interaction of official 
connection and employees’ benefits (PC*EB) is not significant, only the coefficient of 
political connections and firm level benefits are positive and significant at 10% level. But 
we can also conclude that in politically connected firms, employees’ benefits have a 
positive effect on firm performance and improved benefits will increase the firm 
performance. 




Company level benefits Industry level benefits Regional level benefits 
PC 
-0.238***     -0.134**     -0.134**     
(-0.074)     (-0.053)     (-0.057)     
PC1 
  0.025     -0.07     -0.053   
  (-0.122)     (-0.094)     (-0.086)   
PC2 
    -0.332***     -0.172***     -0.173*** 
    (-0.04)     (-0.041)     (-0.05) 
PC*EB 
6.601* 3.302 8.307*** -0.009 0.165** -0.053 -0.058 0.921** -0.347 
(-3.831) (-6.274) (-1.674) (-0.034) (-0.07) (-0.035) (-0.279) (-0.465) (-0.239) 
Size 
0.476*** 0.477*** 0.476*** 0.470*** 0.475*** 0.472*** 0.470*** 0.477*** 0.471*** 
(-0.108) (-0.108) (-0.105) (-0.108) (-0.107) (-0.107) (-0.107) (-0.107) (-0.106) 
Lev 
-3.284*** -3.309*** -3.299*** -3.309*** -3.315*** -3.326*** -3.308*** -3.318*** -3.323*** 
(-0.213) (-0.209) (-0.205) (-0.204) (-0.205) (-0.204) (-0.205) (-0.207) (-0.204) 
Dual 
0.210*** 0.207*** 0.211*** 0.209*** 0.208*** 0.210*** 0.209*** 0.207*** 0.211*** 
(-0.045) (-0.043) (-0.045) (-0.045) (-0.044) (-0.045) (-0.045) (-0.044) (-0.045) 
Ind 
1.202*** 1.222*** 1.199*** 1.223*** 1.225*** 1.206*** 1.223*** 1.223*** 1.199*** 
(-0.222) (-0.241) (-0.237) (-0.241) (-0.248) (-0.244) (-0.237) (-0.258) (-0.239) 
PD 
-1.843*** -1.826*** -1.865*** -1.829*** -1.823*** -1.863*** -1.828*** -1.826*** -1.860*** 
(-0.136) (-0.132) (-0.142) (-0.134) (-0.131) (-0.138) (-0.133) (-0.132) (-0.137) 
FSH 
0.018 -0.017 0.034 -0.01 -0.017 0.01 -0.009 -0.018 0.015 
(-0.246) (-0.252) (-0.252) (-0.252) (-0.255) (-0.25) (-0.25) (-0.256) (-0.249) 
Zindex 0.567** 0.548** 0.578** 0.561** 0.544** 0.577** 0.560** 0.548** 0.574** 
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(-0.25) (-0.249) (-0.247) (-0.247) (-0.244) (-0.246) (-0.245) (-0.243) (-0.245) 
Age 
-0.005 -0.006** -0.004 -0.005 -0.006* -0.004 -0.005 -0.006* -0.004 
(-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) 
Constant 
-6.732*** -6.695** -6.738*** -6.594** -6.655** -6.629** -6.587** -6.694*** -6.594*** 
(-2.567) (-2.584) (-2.497) (-2.56) (-2.562) (-2.545) (-2.544) (-2.555) (-2.518) 
Observations 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 10311 
*** Represent significance at the 1% level. ** Represent significance at the 5% levels. * Represent 




With the development and transformation of the Chinese economy, private firms have 
become an important part of the market economy. The relationship between private firms 
and government has become more important. This paper studies how political 
connections affect the employees’ benefits and firm performance. Focusing on private 
firms from A shares in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2018, I 
explore the impact of political connections on employee welfare and firm performance 
from the perspective of senior executives' political connections. 
 
 
The results show that: (1) the employees’ benefits in politically connected firms are not 
as high as we generally expect. This is due to the fact that the costs of employee welfare 
are larger than the benefits that firms get from political connections. When compared 
with official connection, the employees’ benefits at the representative connection firm are 
lower. (2) Politically connected firms employ more employees than non-affiliated firms. 
After distinguishing between the types of the connections, I find that only the 
representative firms hire more employees. (3) Key executives who have political 
connections damage the performance of the firm. This is due to the fact that political 
connections are huge costs for private firms, which exceed the benefits they get from the 
political connections. (4) The improvement of employees’ benefits will increase the firm 
performance, and the representative connections play a more important role in improving 
the performance of firms. Some findings are counter to popular beliefs. There are also 
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some limitations that need to be further researched. For example, the political 
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